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Rate Regulation Under the UCCC
I. INTRODUCTION
The UCCC's treatment of rate regulation, i.e., setting high
rate ceilings and relying on competition to prevent the ceiling
from being reached, is one of its most controversial provisions.
A general public attitude exists that any charge for interest up
to six percent per annum is in the legitimate area; but any
charge in excess of six percent is illegitimate, usurious and simple
"highway robbery."' Nevertheless, interest rates often exceed
six percent and, in the consumer credit market, often reach into
the upper thirties.2
Politically prudent legislatures have developed a method
which creates the public impression that interest rates are rea-
sonable while allowing the lender the necessary interest to make
the lending of money commercially feasible. This has been
accomplished by the enactment of complex interest statutes that
appear to the untrained eye to set a low rate of interest, but in
reality allow rates two to three times that which the ordinary
purchaser believes he is paying.3
Views differ as to what better aids the consumer. The con-
sumer feels that lower interest rates help him in that he will
have less to pay back. The consumer credit industry argues
that lower interest rates mean fewer loans and that consequently
only the best credit risks will be offered needed credit. A third
1. Malcolm, The New Maximum Charges, in THE RwLmrEs OF
MUiwCEILNGS ON INTEREST AND FINANCE CaARGES 23, 32-33 (The
Conference on Personal Finance Law, 1969); Felsenfeld, Consumer In-
terest Rates: A Public Learning Process, 23 Bus. LAw. 931 (1968).
2. See, e.g., Minnesota's Small Loan Act, MINN. STAT. § 56.13
(1969), which allows for a rate not exceeding 2.75 percent per month on
the unpaid balance of a loan not exceeding $300. This computes out at
33 percent annual interest under Regulation Z of the Truth in Lending
Law, 12 C.F.R. § 226.5 (1970). See also Interest-Usury and Small Loan
Charts in 1 CCH CONSUMMR CREDIT GuIm. 510,540 (1970).
3. Minnesota's usury statute, MnN. STAT. § 334.01 (1969), limits
interest rates to six dollars upon $100 for a year or, if agreed to in
writing, interest may be charged at a rate of eight dollars upon $100
for a year. In reality these two rates allow an annual percentage rate
of approximately 10.75 percent and 14.42 percent when worked out
mathematically as a pre-computed contract. This phenomenon again
appears in Minnesota's Motor Vehicle Instalment Act, Mnw. STAT.
§ 168.72 (1969), which sets limits of $8 per $100, $11 per $100 and $13
per $100 depending on the model year of the car. Converted to an
annual percentage rate, the above interest limitations become 14.42 per-
cent, 19.65 percent and 23.19 percent. It is doubtful whether this type
of arithmetic magic is apparent to the ordinary consumer.
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school of thought urges no limitation on interest rates whatever,
with reliance upon competition to keep rates reasonable. During
the formulation of the UCCC serious consideration was given to
this proposition.4 Various authors have challenged the "pro-
tection of the consumer" argument as justifying the establish-
ment of rate ceilings.5 Present legislation in Massachusetts sets
no rate limitations on certain loans above $3,000;G in New Hamp-
shire there are no limitations on interest rates agreed to in writ-
ing7 and, at present, three states apply no usury ceilings on
banks.8
The proposal was, however, shelved as being politically un-
marketableY The Code's draftsmen chose to formulate a rate
ceiling on the cost of credit which would replace with a single
legislative enactment existing state statutes relating to interest
rates on both consumer loans and credit sales.'0 The Code pro-
vides rate ceilings on all consumer credit transactions." In a
consumer sales transaction, the Code's maximum rate ceilings ap-
ply to the credit service charge1 2 and in a loan transaction to the
loan finance charge.1 3 The credit service charge and loan finance
charge include the sum of all charges payable directly or indi-
rectly by the debtor as an incident to the extension of credit.1 4
The terms do not include charges as a result of default, additional
charges, 15 delinquency charges' 6 or deferral charges.1 7
4. See Felsenfeld, supra note 1, at 933.
5. See, e.g., Shay, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code: An
Economist's View, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 491, 495 (1969); Jordan & Warren,
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 387, 394 (1968).
6. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140, § 114A (1969).
7. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 336:1 (1969).
8. California, Colorado and Connecticut.
9. See Felsenfeld, supra note 1, at 933.
10. The 1969 Minnesota House Bill on the UCCC called for the
repeal of the Bank Instalment Loan Act, MINN. STAT. §§ 48.153-48.157
(1969); the Credit Union Loan Act, MINN. STAT. § 52.14 (1969); the In-
dustrial Loan Act, MINN. STAT. ch. 53 (1969); the Small Loan Act, MINN.
STAT. ch. 56 (1969); the Motor Vehicle Retail Instalment Loan Act, MINN.
STAT. §§ 168.66-168.77 (1969); the Usury Laws, MINN. STAT. § 334.02-
334.06 (1969), and all other inconsistent laws. J. of the House 10-100,
Tuesday, May 13, 1969 (91st day).
11. UCCC § 2.201, Credit Service Charge for Consumer Credit Sales
other than Revolving Charge Accounts; § 2.207, Credit Service Charge
for Revolving Charge Accounts; § 3.201, Loan Finance Charge for Con-
sumer Loans other than Supervised Loans; § 3.508, Loan Finance Charge
for Supervised Loans.
12. UCCC § 2.109.
13. UCCC § 3.109.
14. UCCC §§ 2.109 & 3.109.
15. UCCC §§ 2,202 & 3.202.
16. UCCC §§ 2.203 & 3.303.
17. UCCC §§ 2.204 & 3.204.
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The Code's rate ceilings are similar for consumer loans and
sales. The differentiation in rate treatment is the Code's dis-
tinction between revolving consumer transactions (open-end)",
and non-revolving transactions (closed-end).' 0 Sales under a
revolving charge account have maximum ceilings of two percent
per month on the unpaid balance for amounts of $500 or less
and 1.5 percent per month for amounts over $500.20 Revolving
loan accounts are limited to 18 percent per year which is 1.5
percent per month of the average daily balance of the debt.21
For non-revolving consumer credit sales a general rate ceiling of
18 percent per year on the unpaid balance is imposed2 2 with an
alternative series of higher rates for smaller individual transac-
tions. In these smaller transactions, the credit service charge,
calculated according to the actuarial method 23 may not exceed
the greater of the total of (a) 36 percent per year on that part of
the unpaid balance of amounts which are $300 or less, (b) 21
percent per year on amounts over $300 but less than $1,000 and
(c) 15 percent per year on amounts over $1000; or 18 percent per
year on the unpaid balances of the amount financed.2 4  Non-
revolving loans are also given the 18 percent rate ceiling2 5 with
the exception that supervised loans2 6 are allowed the same al-
ternative series of rates given smaller credit sales transactions.2 7
II. COMPETITION AND FREE ENTRY
Competition and free entry historically have presented prob-
lems in the consumer credit field. The first small loan laws in-
18. UCCC §§ 2.108 & 3.108. In the revolving transaction, whether
loan or sale, three basic criteria are present: (1) the unpaid balances
are debited to an account; (2) the loan finance charge or credit service
charge is not precomputed but is computed on the outstanding unpaid
balances of the buyer's account from time to time (usually monthly),
and (3) the buyer/debtor has the privilege of paying in instalments.
19. The closed-end transaction consists of separate and independent
contracts between the seller/lender and buyer/debtor for each grant of
credit. See UCCC §§ 2.201 & 3.201.
20. UCCC § 2.207(3).
21. UCCC § 3.201(4).
22. UCCC § 2.201(2) (b).
23. UCCC § 1.301(1). Under the actuarial method, payment is ap-
plied first to the credit service charge, and the balance to the unpaid
amount financed.
24. UCCC § 2.201(2).
25. UCCC § 3.201(1).
26. UCCC § 3.501(3). A supervised loan is one which has a loan
finance charge exceeding 18 percent per year. Supervised lenders, as
distinguished from other lenders, are required to be licensed by the
Code Administrator. See UCCC § 3.503.
27. UCCC § 3.508 (2).
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corporated concepts of free entry and competition. Problems
soon emerged in the practices of excessive solicitation, overlend-
ing and collection abuses. Although these were later curbed
by more strict state regulation, the result showed that competi-
tion had produced an overall lowering of interest rates.2 8 The
UCCC, while providing broad administrative powers to curb
such abusive practices, reaffirms the concepts of free entry and
competition.
A basic policy in the Code's treatment of rates is that the
setting of high ceilings is intended merely to establish maximum
rate parameters within which free competition will cause the ac-
tual rates to level off below such ceilings. 20 In order to allow
sufficient room for this competition to work, the Code has estab-
lished a concept of relatively free entry into virtually all seg-
ments of the consumer credit market. With the exception of
the licensing requirements for supervised lenders, 0 there are no
Code provisions limiting or restricting the number or type of
credit institutions that may be established in the community.3 1
This is a radical departure from present commercial statutes
in the State of Minnesota. In Minnesota, the lenders of money
are carefully arranged in a segmented hierarchy3 2 and limited
28. Hubachek, The Development of Regulatory Small Loan Laws,
8 LAw AND CONTEMP. PROB. 108 (1941). Hubachek stated:
A certain sequence of events had followed the enactment of
many small loan laws. First, the loan sharks disappeared.
Then the regulated business began to expand. Due to im-
proved lending techniques, increased volume of business, and
the availability of public capital, it had become possible to
make an attractive net return. A time came when there were
too many licensed lenders and too many dollars seeking to be
lent. Competition so far had been effective only to a very lim-
ited extent in reducing the rates of charge. Instead, it took the
form of excessive solicitation and overlending. This in turn
led to the borrower's delinquency which fostered collection
abuses.
Id. at 121-22.
29. UCCC Prefatory Note XIX.
30. UCCC § 3.503. This licensing procedure is concerned only
with the financial responsibility, character and fitness of the applicant
and eliminates any convenience, need or number limitation tests.
31. The unlimited free entry concept of the Code does not apply
to banking institutions. Their authority to open new offices at which
they receive deposits and make loans is to be controlled by state
statutes presently governing them. See UCCC § 3.503, Comment 3.
32. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ch. 48 (1969), Banks, Trust Companies
Act; MINN. STAT. ch. 52 (1969), Credit Unions Act; MINN. STAT. ch. 53
(1969), Industrial Loan and Thrift Companies Act; MINN. STAT. ch. 50
(1969), Small Loans Act. This segmentation is brought about by limita-
tions on rates that may be charged and on the size, maturity and form
of credit that may be granted by the various types of credit grantors.
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in their financial dealings.33 At the present time, participants
under the Minnesota Small Loans Act 34 are required to show
that their engaging in the small loan business will promote the
convenience of and be an advantage to the community.3 5 The
Code, in order to foster such free entry, has abandoned the
"convenience and advantage" test.30
This provision has been a source of controversy with many
banking institutions. Banks, as deposit-holding institutions, re-
ceive their authority to open new offices or charter new banks
from the present Minnesota statutes.37  In order to charter a
bank in Minnesota a reasonable public demand must be shown 8
and, in addition, there must be a community desire for the bank
and a probable volume of business sufficient to insure the solv-
ency of the new bank and all currently existing banks.3 9 Al-
though banks would continue to be regulated as to the number of
new charters available, the real economic effect on banks should
be negligible.40 In mid-1968, only 10.6 percent of the outstand-
ing personal loans were attributed to finance companies. Of
these loans less than one-third were subject to strict application
of "convenience and advantage" provisions, so that only about
three percent of consumer instalment credit will be signifi-
cantly affected by establishment of freedom of entry.4 '
When allowed to compete with small loan companies, banks
have usually held a competitive edge in that they attract the
better credit risks.42 This reduces the number of defaults, bank-
ruptcies and other types of loan losses which increase the cost of
lending. Banks also have a competitive edge in the lending in-
terest rate market since finance companies often obtain a large
amount of their lending capital through loans from banks. Con-
sequently, the banks, depending on the rates at which they
make the loans to the finance company, have a built-in advan-
33. See, e.g., MntNN. STAT. § 56.15 (1969) of the Small Loans Act
which limits the size of loans to $900.
34. MiNN. STAT. ch. 56 (1969).
35. AiNm. STAT. § 56.04 (1969).
36. See UCCC § 3.503 and comment following.
37. See UCOC §§ 3.503 & 6.107 and comments following.
38. niINN. STAT. § 45.07 (1969).
39. Id. See also Jackson v. Valley Nat'l Bank of Eagan Twp., 277
Minn. 293, 152 N.W.2d 472 (1967); State ex rel Dybdal v. State Sec.
Comn'n, 145 MAnn. 221, 176 N.W.759 (1920).
40. Johnson, The New Law of Finance Charges: Disclosure, Free-
dom of Entry, and Rate Ceilings, 33 LAw & CoN27riw. PROB. 671, 679
(1968).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 676.
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tage in the cost of capital.43  In states like Kansas, where
free entry has long been the rule, commercial banking continues
to be a strong, viable business. 44
Nor have banks been limited in their operations by confine-
ment to a single charter. This is manifested in the recent trend
toward banking by mail and the tremendous growth of the bank
credit card. The fact of the matter is that as banks continue to
expand their operations into the consumer area, it is imperative
for banks that sound, comprehensive consumer laws be enacted
to protect and ensure this continuing expansion.
The effect of the free entry concept on retail instalment sales
in Minnesota would be limited. There are presently no statutes
concerned with instalment sales charges for any goods or serv-
ices, with the exception of automobiles.4 5 It is possible, there-
fore, that under the Code's liberal entry provisions, retailers
could go into the loan business. If a retailer should become a
licensed supervised lender, he would be permitted, under the
Code, to operate his retail business in conjunction with his lend-
ing business on the same premises.40  The similarity, however,
in the interest rates on loans and sales transactions appears to
deny any distinct advantage for the retailer, since he may ob-
tain the same rates in an instalment sales contract as he could
as a supervised lender making a loan.47 Moreover, were he to
become a supervised lender, he would be required to comply with
a new body of administrative regulations under the Code.48 It
is also debatable whether most retailers would be willing to set
aside or tie up the cash reserves usually necessary for operating
a loan venture.
The use of competition to set prices in non-monopolistic
sales of goods and services is a basic element of the consumer
economy. This, however, has not been the case in the money
43. Cf. Benfield, Money, Mortgages and Migraine-The Usury Head-
ache, 19 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 819, 826-830 (1968). The most basic ex-
ample of this type of competitive edge would arise as follows: The bank
pays five percent per year for the use of its depositors' money. When it
makes a loan to the finance company at a prime interest rate of eight
percent, it would immediately have a three percent competitive edge
on the borrowing finance company in the making of loans to the con-
sumer.
44. Clark, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code: Assessing Its Im-
pact Upon One State and Plugging Its Loopholes, 18 KAN. L. Rsv. 277,
286 (1970).
45. MINN. STAT. §§ 168.66-.77 (1969).
46. UCCC § 3.512.
47. Compare UCCC §§ 2.201 & 3.508.
48. UCCC § 6.105.
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market where statutes have long served to control the price of
money. Usury laws, for example, have been enacted in various
forms in virtually every state in an attempt to set limits on in-
terest rates. In a monopolistic credit area, strong arguments can
be made for the adoption and enforcement of strict limits on the
cost of consumer credit, but these arguments are difficult to sus-
tain in an open, competitive market. There is no persuasive
evidence that competitive pricing will not function in the money
market.4 9 The instalment credit market is broad enough, pres-
ently in excess of one hundred billion dollars and growing,5 0
and can be made competitive enough to allow prices to be set by
the forces of supply and demand. 1 One current example of
relatively free entry and substantial competition is the automo-
bile financing market, which presently is shared by virtually
all forms of lending institutions. In the past forty years the
availability of credit has expanded, and due to vigorous competi-
tion, the average level of credit rates has remained well be-
low the statutory rate ceiling.
52
I. USURY
The general usury statutes have long been used in this
country to place limits on the rates of interest in the lending of
money.53 State usury ceilings presently range from 6 to 21 per-
cent with the most prevalent rates being those between 8 and 12
percent.54 However, the costs of making loans or extending
credit often exceed the return permitted by the usury statutes.
In such cases, would-be creditors are economically prevented
from making loans or extending credit. 5  In response to this
economic reality, both courts and legislatures have fashioned
exceptions to the usury laws and have sanctioned higher rates for
transactions in virtually every credit situation.
49. Jordan & Warren, supra note 5, at 391.
50. Richter, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 24 Bus. LAW.
183, 184 (1968).
51. Shay, supra note 5, at 495.
52. Shay, New Automobile Finance Rates, 1924-64, NAT'L BUR. oF
EcoN. REs. 9-12 (1963). See also Johnson, Regulation of Finance Charges
on Consumer Installment Credit, 66 MicH. L. Rnv. 81, 91-92 (1967).
53. See Benfield, supra note 43, at 824-25.
54. 1 CCH CoNsummE CREDr GUm 510 (1970).
55. J. CaiAx- w & R. SHAY, THE CONSUMxR FINANCE INDusRY, ITS
COSTS Am REGULATION 57 (1967). Studies have shown that the total
cost per $100 of loans outstanding in a selected number of finance com-
panies ranged between $18 and $26.
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A. JuDiciAL EXCEPTIONS
In instalment credit sales transactions the courts have form-
ulated the "time price doctrine" to provide the means by which
creditors may finesse the usury statutes.50 The time price doc-
trine57 is a method by which a merchant charges one price for
goods or services if he is to receive immediate payment in cash
of the purchase price; if the merchant must wait for payment, he
may sell the goods for the cash price plus an additional charge
for the credit extended. The difference between the cash price
and the time price is frequently called the time price differen-
tial. A second view of the time price doctrine has been to con-
sider the time price contract as a specific article of commerce
and, like any other article of commerce, it can be sold at any
price agreed upon by the parties.58 Since a sale involves nei-
ther a "loan," which implies an advance of money or personal
property repayable in kind, nor a "forbearance," which signifies
an agreement to refrain from demanding payment of a loan or
debt when due, it has generally been recognized that usury stat-
utes do not apply to sales transactions or to the amount of
service charge imposed in connection with a sale of merchandise
on credit.5 9
The impact and importance to the consumer industry and
the consumer of the time price doctrine as an exception to the
usury statute is illustrated by the usury statute in Arkansas.
Arkansas is the only state which fixes one maximum legal inter-
est rate, ten percent, applicable to all transactions.0 ° The time
price doctrine has been rejected by the Arkansas court as being
contrary to Arkansas' constitutional provisions against usury.0'
This has resulted in a significant decline in the availability of
loan credit, but has proven to have little impact on sales credit
56. The time price principle was first enunciated in an 1827 English
case, Bette v. Bidwood, 108 Eng. Rep. 792 (K.B. 1827) and was reiterated
in 1861 in what is considered to be the leading American case on the
subject, Hogg v. Ruffner, 66 U.S. 115 (1861). It has subsequently been
adopted by the courts of virtually all states in which the subject was
considered.
57. See Kripke, Secured Transactions Financing the Seller, 76
BANING L.J. 185, 192-93 (1959), for a detailed explanation of the
time price doctrine.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Lynch, Consumer Credit at Ten Per Cent Simple: The Ar-
kansas Case, U. OF ILL. L. FORUM 592 (1968).
61. Sloan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 228 Ark. 464, 308 S.W.2d 802
(1957); Hare v. General Contract Purchase Corp., 220 Ark. 601, 249
S.W.2d 973 (1952), rehearing denied, 222 Ark. 291, 262 S.W.2d 287 (1953).
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availability.62 The retailers simply raised their prices to offset
losses on their credit transactions, converting a potential loss of
retail profits into an additional burden on the consumer's
pocketbook.6 3 This action on the part of the retailers, however,
did cause increased out-of-state purchasing, especially in the
border areas, whose net result was a deprivation of income
to the state and a slowdown in economic growth. c4
Minnesota courts have long accepted the time price doctrine 5
as a means of avoiding the state usury statute.6 6 In Van As-
peren v. Darling Olds., Inc.,6 7 the Minnesota Supreme Court up-
held the proposition that
[A] bona fide installment sale does not come within the purview
of the usury statute .... This court has never held as a matter
of law that a sale involving a cash price plus a finance charge
equalling a credit price is usurious. 8
Although Minnesota has accepted the time price doctrine
in instalment sales contracts, there remains considerable doubt
as to whether the doctrine will exempt revolving sales transac-
tions 9 from the usury rate limitations. The difficulty in placing
the revolving sales concept within the time price doctrine arises
from the absence of a precomputed credit price. Under a re-
volving account there is no way the customer can be given a spe-
cific price for the cost of the credit, as each additional transac-
tion increases the cost of the time price payment and under the
general revolving account, payment within a specified period
automatically cancels the time price differential. This method of
financing is not, therefore, an example of a transaction clearly
protected by the time price doctrine. The critical question is
whether this method of financing is to be considered a forbear-
ance on a debt and thereby subject to usury limitations.
62. See Lynch, supra note 60, at 596, 614.
63. Id. at 600-01. Out-of-state cities bordering on the Arkansas
state line exhibited consistently lower prices for similar goods, e.g.
a television which cost $100 in Little Rock, Ark., was $94.26 in Texar-
kana, Tex., $97.18 in Greenville, Miss., $95.37 in Memphis, Tenn, and
$94.43 in Tulsa, Okla.
64. Id. at 619.
65. See Van Asperen v. Darling Olds., Inc., 254 Minn. 62, 93 N.W.2d
690 (1958); Dunn v. Midland Loan Finance Corp., 206 Minn. 550, 289
N.W. 411 (1939); In re Bibbey, 9 F.2d 944 (D. Minn. 1925).
66. Mnqx. STAT. § 334.01 (1969) states in part:
[N]o person shall directly or indirectly take or receive in
money, goods, or things in action, or in any way, any greater sum
.. for the loan or forbearance of money, goods, or things in
action, than $8 on $100 for one year ....
67. 254 Minn. 62, 93 N.W.2d 690 (1958).
68. Id. at 68, 93 N.W.2d at 694-95.
69. See note 18 supra.
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Although the Minnesota courts have not yet ruled on this
issue,70 the Wisconsin Supreme Court recently held 7' that the fi-
nance charge in revolving accounts was a forbearance and subject
to the usury rate limitations. Although the time price doctrine
remains in force in Wisconsin,72 the court stated that a revolving
account lacks certain indicia which determine when a particular
transaction qualifies as a true time price sale.78 Most damaging
was the failure to disclose sufficiently the existence of two
prices (cash and credit price) to both parties.7 ' The court fur-
ther stated that there seemed to be universal acceptance that
bank charge cards are subject to usury limitations75 and upon
careful analysis found it impossible to distinguish between the
revolving account in issue and the bank charge card situation."
The court also repeatedly stressed the importance of substance
over form; in cases of alleged usury, the court would look through
the form of the agreement to the substance.77  Although the
Minnesota court has consistently upheld the time price doc-
trine, they have indicated firmly that they too will look to the
substance of the transaction and not merely to form. 78 If the
agreements are actually a pretense to evade the usury law they
probably will be found invalid.79
It is, therefore, apparent that merchants in the state of Min-
nesota cannot confidently rely on the time price doctrine to ex-
empt retail instalment sales under a revolving account. If the
Minnesota courts would elect to follow the reasoning of the
Wisconsin court's opinion the result may prove devastating to
70. At the time of the writing of this article, the Minnesota At-
torney General has filed suit against Montgomery Ward, Inc., alleging
that the 18 percent annual interest on their revolving charge accounts is
violative of Minnesota's usury statute.
71. State v. J.C. Penney Co., - Wis. 2d _, 179 N.W.2d 641 (1970).
72. Id. at -, 179 N.W.2d at 649-50.
73. Id. at 179 N.W.2d at 651.
74. Id. The court listed additional factors which would support
the finding that a revolving account would not be a time price sale, i.e.,
ambiguous terms in the sales contract, seller's specific agreement tofinance the purchase, credit price calculated in terms of interest or per-
centage or a sales tax computed on the cash price, giving the customer
the option of lowering the price of the merchandise by payment even
after the services have begun to run.
75. Id. at , 179 N.W.2d at 647.
76. Id. at , 179 N.W.2d at 652.
77. Id. at , 179 N.W.2d at 647.
78. Van Asperen v. Darling Olds., Inc., 254 Minn. 62, 67, 93 N.W.2d
690, 695 (1958).
79. Melbo v. Rinn, 280 Minn. 72, 157 N.W.2d 842 (1968); Midland
Loan Finance Co. v. Lorentz, 209 Minn. 278, 296 N.W. 911 (1941).
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many reputable retailers. Where a transaction is found to have
violated the Minnesota usury statute, the creditor stands to lose
not only the interest but also the principal.8 0 In the State of
Minnesota, therefore, there exists a definite possibility that mil-
lions of dollars will be lost by merchants, depending on the de-
gree to which a court may choose to extend the time price doc-
trine.
B. LEGISLATIVE EXCEPTIONS
Exceptions to the usury statutes for the lending of money
have developed primarily through legislative action. Prior to
any attempts by the legislatures to formulate exceptions to the
usury statutes, the money-lending trade was subjected to the
usury statutes. A large portion of the consumer market was
excluded from credit because when a lender could not make a
reasonable profit on his loans and was prohibited from raising
his price for credit, he adjusted by limiting his market to select
credit risks. The poor credit risks, unable to obtain credit from
reputable lenders, were forced to seek needed money from crimi-
nal lenders at exorbitant rates.8 ' The legislatures reacted to
this situation with a variety of acts designed to exempt credit
transactions from low general usury statutes. These statutes in-
dude such enactments as small loan laws, industrial loan acts,
bank consumer loan laws and Morris Plan Company laws.
With varying terms these statutes permit lending institutions to
charge rates higher than those permitted by general usury stat-
utes.
8 2
The unrealistic rate limitations under the Minnesota general
usury statute prompted the legislature's enactment of various
usury exemption statutes.8 3 The Bank Instalment Loan Act,8 4
80. Mnm STAT. §§ 334.02 & 334.03 (1969).
81. Hubachek, The Development of Regulatory Small Loan Laws,
8 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 108-170 (1941). See also Smith, The Texas
Constitutional Amendment, 15 PERSONAL FIN. L.Q. RnP. 37 (1961).
82. Malcolm, The New Maximum Charges, in Tam REALiT OF
MkAXMUM CEILNGS ON INTEREST AND FINANCE CHARGES 23, 27 (The Con-
ference on Personal Finance Law, 1970).
83. The Minnesota courts consider loans of money to be gov-
erned by the usury statute unless higher rates are specifically au-
thorized by the legislature. See, e.g., Dunn v. Midland Loan Finance
Co., 206 Minn. 550, 554, 289 N.W. 411, 413 (1939).
84. TINN. STAT. § 48.153 (1969). Banks lending less than $5,000
may deduct six percent in advance for five years (this is a true annual
rate of 15 percent under Regulation Z of the Federal Consumer Credit
Protection Act).
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Industrial Loan Act, 5 Credit Union Act s" and Small Loan
Act 8 7 each provide for rates in excess of the Minnesota usury
statute. In fact, the cumulative judicial and legislative actions
have so emasculated the usury statute that, at the present time,
the usury statute governs fewer than one-third of Minnesota's
credit transactions.88
C. UCCC AND USURY
Enactment of the UCCC would effectively repeal the rate
ceiling of Minnesota's general usury statute in cases of con-
sumer credit transactions and would preempt all other statu-
tory rate ceilings theretofore imposed on credit transactions. 0
Replacing the usury rate limitations and the complex and vary-
ing particular exceptions to the usury statute would be a uni-
form set of rate ceilings applicable to virtually all forms of con-
sumer credit transactions. The use of a high maximum rate
ceiling would accomplish the objective of protecting the con-
sumer against unlimited ranges in rates while at the same time
providing the lender or merchant sufficient room in which to
compete effectively and still make a reasonable return on his
investment and services.
IV. RATE REGULATION AND LOANS
The Code's basic maximum rate on consumer loans,"0 de-
fined as the loan finance charge,9 1 is 18 percent per year on the
unpaid balance,9 2 except that supervised lenders 3 may, if they
choose, impose annual rates of up to 36 percent on loans under
$300, 21 percent on amounts between $300 and $1,000, and 15
percent on the amount of the unpaid balance in excess of
$1,000.94 Uncertainty or disagreement on the method of deter-
85. MINN. STAT. § 53.04 (1969). Industrial loan companies are
permitted to deduct eight percent in advance for three years (18.75
percent under Regulation Z).
86. MiNN. STAT. § 52.14 (1969). Credit unions may charge 12
percent per year.
87. M=N. STAT. § 56:13 (1969). Small loan companies may charge
up to 2.75 percent per month on the unpaid balance for loans up to $300
(33 percent under Regulation Z).
88. See Benfield, supra note 43, at 897.
89. UCCC § 9.103.
90. UCCC § 3.104.
91. UCCC § 3.109.
92. UCCC § 3.201(1).
93. UCCC §§ 3.501-.503. The supervised lender must be licensed
by the Administrator under the UCCC.
94. UCCC § 3.508(2).
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mining the interest rate is eliminated under the Code-charges
may be calculated and paid on any basis provided the specified
rates are not exceeded. 95 This allows the creditor to handle his
bookkeeping and nomenclature in a manner most convenient to
him while the consumer remains protected and informed by the
rate ceiling and disclosure provisions.
Included in the loan finance charge are all charges paid di-
rectly or indirectly by the debtor with the exception of default
charges, additional charges and deferral charges which are ex-
pressly excluded from the definition of loan finance charge.00
These charges are treated separately for rate ceiling and dis-
closure purposes.97 A lender may contract for, in addition to the
loan finance charge, official fees and taxes, charges for insurance
and other benefits if such charges are reasonably related to the
benefits received.98 In the case of an instalment not paid within
ten days of its due date, the lender may contract to charge an
additional five percent of the amount of the unpaid instalment
not to exceed five dollars.99 Further charges for deferral,100 re-
financing10' and consolidation, 10 2 while not included under the
rate ceiling, are provided for in the Code. The debtor is allowed
to make a full repayment of the consumer loan at any time with-
out penalty. 0 3 Although an acceleration penalty is prohibited,
the lender does not automatically forfeit the interest altogether;
the "Rule of 78" applies,'0 4 assuring the lender a portion of the
interest based on a relationship of the greater risk assumed in the
early months and the amount of the loan. The full repayment
privilege does not automatically give the debtor the right to make
a partial repayment; this can be done only with the consent of
the creditor. 0 5
Although the maximum rates for loans may appear unus-
ually high, fifteen states' small loan laws presently permit certain
rates which exceed the maximum Code rates. 00
95. UCCC §§ 2.201(3), 3.201(2) & 3.508(3).
96. UCCC § 3.508 and comment following.
97. See UCCC § 2.109 and comment following.
98. UCCC § 3.202(1).
99. UCCC § 3.203(1).
100. UCCC § 3.204.
101. UCCC § 3.205.
102. UCCC § 3.206.
103. UCCC § 3.209.
104. UCCC § 3.210.
105. UCCC § 3.209.
106. See, e.g., GA. CoDE A'N. §§ 25-301 to -324 (1959); Miss. CODE
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In order to determine whether rates are unnecessarily high
or merely reflect the actual cost at which money may be extended
in return for a reasonable profit, it is first necessary to examine
some basic elements of the consumer credit business. Four basic
ingredients are involved in determining the rate at which a loan
will be made: (1) the cost of money, (2) the cost of administering
the loan, (3) the amount of risk involved as to possible nonrepay-
ment and (4) the amount of competition facing the lender.'"' A
recent study of a large sample group of finance companies showed
the annual total costs per $100 on loans outstanding ranged from
approximately $18 to $26, with the average loan running about
$20 per $100 lent.108 This would mean that on the average the
finance company must charge at least 20 percent interest to break
even. Operating costs also are higher for the smaller loans and
lower for the larger extensions, computed on a ratio per $100.
Further studies have shown that regardless of the prevailing rate
levels among lenders, the profit margins did not differ signif-
icantly. 10 9 The study's conclusion was that legitimate companies
adjust their rates to produce the level of profits required by the
competitive capital markets for this type of business."10 Thus,
if rates are low, the net income to the lender usually shows little
change from that under a high rate; what is diminished is the
level of service provided to borrowers. Where rates are too low,
the high risk loans and small, unprofitable loans are not offered
to the consumer.11
The intended function of the UCCC's rate ceiling is to decide
when rates become unconscionable, not to set the going market
rate, which is the purpose of current rate ceilings."12 A com-
parison of the loan rates under state loan law rate ceilings with
those under the proposed UCCC shows that the rates under the
UCCC are slightly higher in almost all categories.
ANN. § 5591-01 to -20 (Supp. 1968); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 8-701 to -796
(1962). The other states are Alaska, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Indiana,
Louisiana, Nevada, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah and
Wyoming. See Shay, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code: An Econo-
mist's View, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 491, 496 (1969).
107. Benfield, Money, Mortgages and Migraines-The Usury Head-
ache, 19 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 819, 826 (1968).
108. J. CHAPMAN & R. SHAY, THE CONSUMER FINANCE INDUSTRY, ITS
COSTS AND REGULATION 57 (1967).
109. Id. at 143.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See UCCC § 2.201 and comment following.
[Vol. 55:525
1971] RATE REGULATION 539
TABLE I
CO~mARiSoN OF MEDIAN YIELDS OF SELECTED LOAN SIZES UNDER STATE
SMALL LOAN LAw RATE CEILINGS, EARLY 1968, WITH
PROPOSED RATE CEILINGS UNDER THE UCCC
Number Median Effective
of Rate Annual
State Ceilings Rate
Cash Advanced Small Loan 3arly 1968 Ceiling
to Borrowers Laws Costa UCCC Difference
$ 100 47 36.00% 36.00% -
200 47 34.92 36.00 1.08%
300 47 32.88 36.00 3.12
400 41 30.36 34.80 4.44
500 41 28.80 33.24 4.44
600 41 27.48 31.80 4.32
700 35 26.52 30.72 4.20
800 35 25.44 29.76 4.32
900 31 24.72 28.92 4.20
1,000 30b 23.64 28.20 4.56
1,100 18b 22.20 27.60 5.40
1,200 18b 21.84 27.00 5.16
1,300 18b 21.72 26.40 4.68
1,400 18b 21.60 25.80 4.20
1,500 18b 21.36 25.32 3.96
(a) loans with 12 month maturity, January 1, 1968.(b) dollar cost of loan computed by interpolation between states above
and below median.
Source: Helmuth Miller of Beneficial Finance Corporation' 1 3
In Minnesota, where loan rates presently range from 12 to
33 percent,1 1 4 the Code would not effect a drastic change in max-
imum rate ceilings. The 1969 Minnesota Legislature in consider-
ing adoption of the UCCC, made only minor changes in the rec-
ommended rate ceilings. 1 5 Although the Bill failed by a narrow
margin, the slight changes in the Code's rate ceilings by the
Legislature would seem to indicate that such rates were not con-
sidered exorbitant or objectionable per se. It cannot be empha-
sized too strongly that the high interest ceilings in the Code are
not intended to grant lenders a means by which they might
wring extra profits from the consumer. They are, to the con-
trary, meant to encourage competition and still allow the lender
a fair return. The critic who oversimplifies and condemns such
rates as unreasonable and exorbitant exhibits a lack of com-
prehension as to the basic economic fact that when the lender
113. Shay, The Impact of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code Upon
the Market for Consumer Installment Credit, 33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
752, 754 (1968).
114. See notes 83-86 supra.
115. H.F. No. 438, J. of the House, Tuesday, May 13, 1969 (91st day),
changed the 36 percent rate for loans by supervised lenders for amounts
under $300 to 33 percent (UCCC § 3.508).
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cannot make a profit on his loans he either ceases to lend or se-
riously limits those to whom he will lend. Those especially vul-
nerable to this phenomenon are the consumers who most need
available lending capital. If consumers are unable to procure
needed credit through legitimate channels, the loan sharks are
always too happy to help out.
V. INSTALMENT SALES AND REVOLVING ACCOUNTS
Instalment credit, the kind of credit for which a consumer
pays a fee for the privilege of paying off the debt over a period
of time, is big business. It far exceeds non-instalment credit in
volume. Instalment credit in September of 1968 totalled 82.9 bil-
lion dollars as compared with 21.4 billion in non-instalment
credit.116 Of this amount, the instalment credit held by retail
outlets alone has increased from 755 million dollars in 1920 to
almost 11 billion in 1968.117 A complex structure of largely un-
related statutes and legal doctrines, ranging from the time price
doctrine and state usury statutes to the Federal Consumer Credit
Protection Act and various state instalment sales acts presently
regulates this growing leviathan. The UCCC has been offered
as a comprehensive, uniform system to eliminate the present
quagmire of instalment credit.
In the UCCC the term credit service charge"18 is substituted
for the term interest with respect to credit sales. It includes all
charges imposed on the buyer such as time price differential, serv-
ice or carrying charges, insurance charges, investigation charges
and charges for commissions and brokerage fees. Charges for
default, additional charges, delinquency charges and deferral
charges are expressly excluded from the definition of a credit
service charge. 119 The types of sales to which the credit service
charge applies are consumer credit sales,1 20 consumer leases,
1 2
'
consumer related sales 22 and revolving charge accounts.
12
'
A consumer credit sale is defined basically as a sale of goods,
services or interest in land purchased for a family, household or
116. 54 FED. RES. BULL. No. 11 at 52-53 (1968).
117. NAT'L RETAIL MERcH. ASS'N, EcoN. CHARAcTERIsTIcs or DEP'T
STORE CREDIT 8 (1969).
118. UCCC § 2.109.
119. Id. Comment.
120. UCCC § 2.104.
121. UCCC § 2.106.
122. UCCC § 2.602.
123. UCCC § 2.108.
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agricultural purpose, and the amount financed must not exceed
$25,000.124 The consumer lease must be a lease by a person, not an
organization, for a personal, family, household or agricultural pur-
pose for a term exceeding four months.12 5 A consumer related
sale is a sale of goods, services or an interest in land which is not
subject to the provisions of a consumer credit sale and is in an
amount under $25,000. The consumer related sale does not apply
to organizations but only to persons. This provision makes the
Code applicable to numerous small business transactions which
would not be for a personal, family household or agricultural
purpose.1 2 6 The revolving charge account includes purchases of
goods or services with credit cards where a credit service charge
is not precomputed but is computed on the unpaid balances of
the buyer's account from time to time. -1 2 7 The amount charged
for the above sales, leases, consumer related sales or revolving
charge accounts is the credit service charge.
The credit service charge has a general maximum rate of 18
percent per year, 28 with two exceptions: (a) revolving charge
accounts may carry a maximum rate of two percent per month on
$500 or less but 1.5 percent on that part of the amount over
$500,129 and (b) in place of the 18 percent rate, consumer credit
sales, except revolving charge accounts, may charge up to the
following maximum ceilings: (1) 36 percent per year on the un-
paid balance of an amount not exceeding $300; (2) 21 percent for
amounts between $300 and $1,000, and (3) 11 percent on those
amounts over $1,000.130 A minimum charge of $5 may also be
imposed if the amount is less than $75, or $7.50 when the amount
exceeds $75.131
The UCCC rates have often been criticized as being too high.
Again it must be remembered that these rates are ceilings and
under the Code's use of competition and free entry the actual
rates should tend to be lower than those legally allowed In ad-
124. UCCC § 2.104(1). It does not include a purchase with a lender
credit card or, except for the disclosure provisions, a sale of land where
the credit service charge is less than ten percent. The $25,000 limit does
not apply to land sales.
125. Consumer lease does not include a lease pursuant to a lender
credit card. UCCC § 2.107.
126. See UCCC § 2.602 and comments following.
127. UCCC § 2.108. The buyer also is given the privilege of pay-
ing the balances in instalments.
128. UCCC § 2.201(2) (b).
129. UCCC § 2.207(3).
130. UCCC § 2.201(2) (a).
131. UCCC § 2.201(6).
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dition, there must be faced the reality that extending credit is a
costly undertaking. A recent study, conducted by the National
Retail Merchant's Association, of customer credit in department
stores indicated that the total credit costs for all stores included
in the study exceeded their $36.5 million total service charge rev-
enue by $14.7 million. The average deficiency for all partici-
pants amounted to 3.41 percent of credit sales. 3 2 Theoretically,
therefore, the average department store would enhance its profits
by eliminating the credit function-if it could maintain the same
sales volume. In a practical sense, however, eliminating the
credit function would unquestionably adversely affect sales.1'3'
The study further indicated that the cost of extending credit has
increased in recent years. 34 This leaves the retail merchant in
the peculiar position that if he curtails credit to eliminate
losses, he compounds his losses by diminished sales. The loser in
this situation turns out to be the consumer, especially the cash
purchaser. The merchant, in order to cover his losses, will raise
the price of his goods. By this means the cash purchaser is
forced to subsidize the credit purchaser. A more reasonable ap-
proach should be to allow the merchant to reasonably raise the
cost of credit, thereby charging the credit consumer rather than
penalizing the cash purchaser.
In Minnesota there are no credit rate limitations on sales with
the exception of the sale of motor vehicles. 3 5 The Motor Vehicle
Instalment Act sets up staggered time price differential stand-
ards depending on the model year of the car. Vehicles less than
one year old may have a price differential not exceeding $8 per
$100 per year (14.42 percent annual rate); vehicles older than one
but newer than three years cannot exceed $11 per $100 (20.72
percent annual rate), and vehicles over three years old may not
have a charge exceeding $13 per $100 per year (23.19 percent an-
nual rate) plus a flat charge of $3 for the retail instalment con-
tract. The time price differential, the equivalent of the Code's
credit service charge, also includes all charges for investigating
credit worthiness and expenses for the making of the contract.'13
Delinquency charges are separate and may be in an amount not
in excess of five percent of each instalment or $5, whichever is
132. NAT'L RETAIL MERCH. Ass'N, EcoN. CHARACTERISTICS OF DEP'T
STORE CREDIT 50 (1969).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 52.
135. MINN. STAT. §§ 168.66-.77 (1969).
136. MINN. STAT. § 168.72(d) (1969).
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less.137
Although the Code's rate ceilings are higher than Minnesota's
counterpart for instalment sales, it is doubtful that the rates
would increase significantly if the Code were enacted.1 8 Fur-
thermore, the fact remains that Minnesota's rate protections for
consumer instalment sales are woefully inadequate. There are
no state statutes concerning instalment sales charges for any
other goods or services than automobiles. No statutory protec-
tion is afforded the consumer with regard to revolving charge
account rates. The existing judicial framework for such charges,
the time price doctrine, can in cases of revolving accounts be
termed at best uncertain. The very fact that a multi-million dol-
lar market in Minnesota is presently being regulated by a com-
plex, uncertain and woefully incomplete mish-mash of statutes
and judicial opinions should spur both consumer and business
interest groups to demand the enactment of a comprehensive uni-
form system of consumer credit regulation. The Uniform Con-
sumer Credit Code offers the balanced, rational means by which
this task can be accomplished.
137. Mnw. STAT. § 168.71(a) (3) (1969).
138. Shay, New Automobile Finance Rates 1924-64, Bum. op EcoN.
RES. 9-12 (1963). See also Johnson, Regulation of Finance Charges on
Consumer Instalment Credit, 66 Mica L. REv. 81, 91-92 (1967).
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